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Motivation

• The pandemic has exposed many underlying inequalities throughout the
United states
• Access to banking services is one such inequality that has been further
exposed by the pandemic and the response to it.
• Many American live in a banking desert or banking hinterland.
• This may make it harder on small businesses since they will not have as much
access to “relational lending.”

• The pandemic caused many businesses to layof their workers.
• The Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), was created in March 2020 to help
struggling small business owners retain their employees.
• Loans were originally distributed through existing SBA 7(a) lenders.
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• We examine how the preexisting geographic distribution of banks afected the
disbursement of PPP loans.
• We have three main hypotheses:
• Relative banking deserts and hinterlands received fewer PPP loans.
• Loans went to relatively advantaged labor markets.
• The smallest businesses (those with less than 50 and less than 10 employees)
were not the major benefciaries of the program.
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• PPP loan data come from the Small Business Administration (November
2020).
• Number of loans, loan amount, number of jobs reported, and business address.

• Banking data come from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the
National Credit Union Administration.
• Number, type, and location of banks.

• These data are combined with other county-level measures and then
aggregated up to the commuting zone level.
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Yi = β0 +β1 Bank Concentrationi + β2 (Bank Concentration)2i + β3 Bank HQsi
+β4 (BankHQs)i2 + β5 COVID19i + β6 NonWhite Sharei
Emp.
H.H.Med.Inc.
+β7 Smallest Business Sharei + β8
+ β9
Pop. i
H.H.MeanInc. i
+β10 GDP per Capitai + β11 BA + Sharei + ϵi
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All PPP Loans: Hypothesis 1
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Banks + C.U.s per 10k
(Banks + C.U.s per 10k)2

Conclusions

Bank HQs per 10k
(Bank HQs per 10k)2

Loans per Sm. Bus.
1.002∗∗∗
(6.89)
−0.527∗∗∗
(−5.76)
0.333∗∗
(2.46)
−0.115
(−1.24)

Amount per Sm. Bus.
−0.234∗
(−1.78)
0.049
(0.57)
0.102
(0.73)
−0.079
(−0.47)

Jobs per Sm. Bus.
−0.183
(−1.37)
0.012
(0.15)
0.215
(1.61)
−0.096
(−0.60)

Highlighted standardized results presented. All specifcations include the full slate of controls and
robust standard errors were calculated. T-statistics included in parenthesis.
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Employment
Population

Share of Bus. < 10 Emp.
Share of Bus. < 50 Emp.

Loans per Sm. Bus.

Amount per Sm. Bus.

Jobs per Sm. Bus.

0.203∗∗∗
(4.08)
−0.148∗∗∗
(−3.39)
−0.151∗∗∗
(−3.58)

0.206∗∗∗
(3.20)

0.219∗∗∗
(2.67)

Highlighted standardized results presented. All specifcations include the full slate of controls and
robust standard errors were calculated. T-statistics included in parenthesis.
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Bank HQs per 10k
(Bank HQs per 10k)2

Loans per Sm. Bus.
0.968∗∗∗
(7.05)
−0.564∗∗∗
(−6.69)
0.397∗∗∗
(2.96)
−0.272∗∗∗
(−3.39)

Amount per Sm. Bus.
0.001
(0.01)
−0.097
(−1.38)
0.211∗
(1.68)
−0.256∗
(−1.74)

Jobs per Sm. Bus.
0.057
(0.47)
−0.142∗
(−1.86)
0.364∗∗∗
(2.92)
−0.338∗∗
(−2.16)

Highlighted standardized results presented. All specifcations include the full slate of controls and
robust standard errors were calculated. T-statistics included in parenthesis.
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Employment
Population

Share of Bus. < 10 Emp.
Share of Bus. < 50 Emp.

Loans per Sm. Bus.

Amount per Sm. Bus.

Jobs per Sm. Bus.

0.229∗∗∗
(5.45)
−0.155∗∗∗
(−432)
−0.122∗∗∗
(−3.33)

0.320∗∗∗
(4.37)

0.261∗∗∗
(3.73)

Highlighted standardized results presented. All specifcations include the full slate of controls and
robust standard errors were calculated. T-statistics included in parenthesis.
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• The Paycheck Protection Program evolved as time went on.
• Some of the restrictions on lenders were loosened to make the disbursement of
loans easier.

• To capture the changing nature of the program we also use the sample of
loans from when the regulations were changed after the frst round.
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Round 2 Results
• Hypothesis 1:
• Commuting zones with a higher concentration of banks still received more PPP
loans (0.700∗∗∗ ).
• Diminishing returns to the number of banks are also present for the 2nd round of
loans (-0.317∗∗ ).
• Bank Headquarters were not a signifcant factor in the second round.

• Hypothesis 2:
• Commuting Zones with stronger labor markets received more loans, but the
result is not as strong as the previous results (0.103∗ ).

• Hypothesis 3:
• The CZs with the a greater share of the smallest businesses still received fewer
loans in the second round of funding (Less than 10: -0.096∗ ; Less than 50:
-0.133∗∗∗ ).
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• Part of the regulation change after the frst round of funding was allowing
fntech companies to make PPP loans.
• Fintech companies rely more on automation to make lending decisions.

• Fintech companies are able to make loans remotely, so borrowers are not
geographically constrained.
• This may reduce the inequality of access that originally existed in the PPP.
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Fintech Results
• Hypothesis 1:
• CZs with fewer banks received more of the fntech loans (0.634∗∗∗ ).
• These CZs also received a greater total amount per small business (0.724∗∗∗ ).
• More jobs per small business were retained with the fntech sample in high
banking CZs (0.701∗∗∗ ).

• Hypothesis 2:
• Places with a relatively stronger labor market did not get more of the fntech
loans.

• Hypothesis 3:
• CZs with a higher share of small businesses with less than 10 employees were not
disadvantaged for the fntech loans, but CZs with a greater share of small
businesses with less than 50 employees did receive signifcantly fewer fntech
PPP loans (-0.173∗∗∗ ).
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Conclusions

• An existing relationship with a bank is benefcial for businesses.
• Banks can utilize “soft” information and “relational lending” when making
lending decisions.

• We fnd evidence that access to banks mattered for receiving PPP loans.
• Places with a higher concentration of banks received a higher number of PPP
loans.
• This held when we examined the program in total, frst round loans, and second
round loans.
• Fintech loans improved access and went to places with fewer banks per person.
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• Access to banks should be taken into account for future similar programs.
• Fintech can be a solution to the issue of access and should be part of future
policy.
• More policies are needed to support community banks and increase access to
community banks.
• Targeting the loans toward regions that faced particularly stark economic
shocks would have help equalize the distribution.
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Number of PPP Loans by Bank Type
(1)
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Banks + C.U.s per 10k people
(Banks + C.U.s per 10k people)2

1.030∗∗∗
(0.0112)
-0.552∗∗∗
(0.000293)

people)2

C.U.s per 10k people

-0.019
(0.0288)

-0.049
(0.0282)

(C.U.s per 10k people)2

0.044
(0.0126)

0.049
(0.0120)

Comm. Banks per 10k people

1.171∗∗∗
(0.00888)

(Comm. Banks per 10k people)2

-0.581∗∗∗
(0.000236)
0.367∗∗∗
(0.0151)

Non-Comm. Banks per 10k people

-0.247∗∗∗
(0.00225)

(Non-Comm. Banks per 10k people)2

Bank HQs per 10k people
(Bank HQs per 10k people)2

Back

(3)

-0.527∗∗∗
(0.000280)

Banks per 10k people

(Banks per 10k

(2)

1.002∗∗∗
(0.0102)

0.333∗∗

0.305∗∗

(0.0284)

(0.0302)

0.183
(0.0292)

-0.115
(0.00336)

-0.109
(0.00350)

-0.026
(0.00352)
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(1)
Loans
0.260∗∗∗
(3.30)

(2)
Loan Amount
-0.086
(-1.31)

(3)
Jobs Retained
-0.053
(-0.81)

Bank HQs per 10k people

0.071
(0.78)

-0.018
(-0.35)

-0.021
(-0.31)

(Banks + C.U.s per 10k people)2

-0.106
(-1.34)

-0.051
(-1.05)

-0.060
(-1.18)

(Bank HQs per 10k people)2

0.059
(0.43)

0.049
(0.71)

0.082
(0.84)

Micro

-0.024∗
(-1.92)

-0.002
(-0.07)

0.031
(1.47)

Rural

-0.001
(-0.03)

-0.032
(-0.86)

0.005
(0.14)

Banks + C.U.s per 10k people

Back
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COVID-19 Cases per 10k
Non-white Share

Back

All Loans
0.060∗∗
(2.32)
1.59∗∗∗
(3.40)

First Round
-0.035∗
(-1.80)
0.050
(1.37)

Fintech
0.177∗∗∗
(3.84 )
0.221∗∗∗
(4.61)

